Abstract
The study examines the key challenges and threats to collective security of Europe in the context of the russian-Ukrainian war. Hybrid threats have become a topical issue for EU countries since 2014. Europe faced a number of challenges that included strengthening its defense capabilities, forming a set of measures to protect the information sphere and cyberspace, and defining a clear position at the highest political level regarding the issue of the russian-Ukrainian war. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of russia, European countries have faced a serious challenge related to the security of the EU’s eastern borders. It was found out that the russian aggression changed the views of the political leaders of certain countries regarding the pacification of the aggressor. It became obvious that attempts to peacefully settle the russian-Ukrainian war through concessions on Ukrainian territories are impossible and may create a number of similar precedents in the future. It was found out that since 2014, the EU and NATO have been developing a set of measures aimed at preventing hybrid threats, and the main international documents on which these measures were based have been highlighted. The latest and traditional approaches to solving hybrid conflicts, their advantages and disadvantages are characterized. The problems of collective security of Europe after February 24, 2022 are highlighted. The specifics of the course of the war, as well as the challenges faced by Europe are revealed. Attention is focused on the peculiarities of russia’s use of hybrid methods of war, the reasons and impact on modern geopolitical realities are characterized. The article shows the relevance of a detailed study of this problem and the prospects of the latest approaches to the formation of the country’s security. The russian-Ukrainian war proved the need to reform international security structures, in particular the UN Security Council, to find new methods of countering propaganda, to strengthen the readiness of government institutions, military structures, and the civilian population to successfully respond to hybrid threats
Keywords
challenges, hybrid threats, security, conflict, politics, Europe, Ukraine
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